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There’s a Whole World Out There: Justice Kennedy’s Use 
of International Sources 
Stephen C. McCaffrey* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, a pivotal member of the Supreme Court, has 
shown a tendency in a number of his opinions for the Court to draw upon 
international sources—that is, legal materials from countries and systems outside 
of the United States. This is particularly true in three cases1: Lawrence v. Texas,2 
Roper v. Simmons,3 and Graham v. Florida.4 This Article will briefly survey 
Justice Kennedy’s use of international materials in these cases and note reactions 
to this practice by other members of the Court. 
A. New Legal Isolationism in America? 
It takes no more than a glance at the earliest volumes of U.S. Reports to 
confirm that the practice of drawing upon international sources is nothing new to 
the Supreme Court. Beginning with its earliest opinions in the 1790s, the Court 
has often referred to international law and non-American materials.5 Chief Justice 
John Jay explained in the Court’s 1793 decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, “the 
United States had, by taking a place among the nations of the earth, become 
amenable to the laws of nations; and it was their interest as well as their duty to 
 
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. 
1. Another opinion for the Court by Justice Kennedy, Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010), could 
also be cited in this connection, but will not be discussed here because case law of other countries was used in 
relation to the interpretation of a treaty, the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 
Oct. 25, 1980, 102 Stat. 437, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–11, not in the 
interpretation of the Constitution. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1987. The issue in Abbott produced a rather odd 
constellation of votes on the Court, with Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Alito, and Sotomayor joining Justice 
Kennedy in the majority, and Justice Stevens filing a dissenting opinion in which Justices Thomas and Breyer 
joined. Id. But Justice Stevens’ dissent was more critical of the majority’s conclusion that the views of “sister 
signatories” reflected the “broad acceptance” of the interpretation adopted by the majority claimed by Justice 
Kennedy than of the use of foreign sources itself. Id. at 2008–09 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
2. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
3. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
4. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
5. See David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge, International Law in the Supreme 
Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 7 (D. Sloss, 
M. Ramsey & W. Dodge eds., 2011). 
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provide, that those laws should be respected and obeyed . . . .”6 The Court has 
even relied on international law as the rule of decision in some cases.7 
What is new is the strident criticism of this practice in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century,8 by both dissenting members of the Court9 and 
commentators in academia,10 politics,11 and the media.12 This criticism appears to 
reflect an unfortunate, isolationist, and almost xenophobic tendency—enacted 
into law in Oklahoma13 and several other states14—toward barring courts from 
relying on international or foreign laws. 
But Justice Kennedy, continuing the long tradition of the Supreme Court, has 
not refrained from mentioning international sources, despite blistering dissents by 
some of his colleagues on this point. To read these dissenting opinions, and some 
of the reactions by commentators in the media, one would think that Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the Court, relied entirely upon international authority as the 
basis of his decisions. 
We can perhaps forgive media commentators for not actually having read the 
opinions in question; if they had, they would know that international authority 
was referred to merely to confirm a decision at which the Court had already 
arrived. The Court was not blazing a new trail, but was rather joining other 
Western nations and the rest of the international community. 
 
6. 2 U.S. 419, 474 (1793); see also, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 281 (1796). 
7. See, e.g., Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (relying on a rule of customary international law). 
8. See Mark Tushnet, International Law and Constitutional Interpretation in the Twenty-First Century: 
Change and Continuity, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, supra note 5, at 507–17. 
9. See infra notes 23, 33–40, and accompanying text.  
10. See, e.g., H.R.Res. on the Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of the Constitution 
of the U.S.: Hearing on H.R. Res. 97 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 109–40 (2005) (statement of 
Prof. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz) (describing and endorsing a proposed constitutional amendment barring references 
to the laws of other states in construing the Constitution) referred to in Tushnet, supra note 8, at n.3. The amendment 
proposed by Professor Rosenkranz would read: “This Constitution was ordained and established by the People of the 
United States, and so it shall not be construed by reference to the contemporary laws of other nations.” Nicholas Quinn 
Rosenkranz, An American Amendment, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 482 (2009). See generally Mark Tushnet, 
When Is Knowing Less Better than Knowing More?: Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme Court  
Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2006), for the critical analysis of the objections to referring to 
foreign law. 
11. See the examples cited by Tushnet, supra note 8, at 507 n.3. 
12. See, e.g., C. Levy, Sotomayor and International Law, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2009, at A13; Editorial, 
Kagan: Foreign Law Trumps Constitutional Law, WASH. TIMES, May 25, 2010, at 2; Editorial, Sharia in 
America’s Courts; Koranic Law: Coming to a City Near You, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2012, at 2; and Op-
Editorial, Legal Eagle: Foreign Laws Don’t Apply to U.S. Cases, OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 17, 2009, at 8A. 
13. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). 
14. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001 (Supp. 2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3101 to -3103 
(2011); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 20-15-102 (2010); see generally Martha F. Davis & Johanna Kalb, Oklahoma and 
Beyond: Understanding the Wave of State Anti-Transnational Law Initiatives, 87 IND. L.J. SUPP. 1, 3 (2011) 
(citing laws, initiatives, and constitutional amendments of a number of states). 
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This is evident from the following discussion of the main cases in question. 
B. Justice Kennedy’s Use of International Sources 
We can begin with Lawrence v. Texas, decided by the Court in 2003.15 
Lawrence, as is now well known, involved a conviction under a Texas statute 
that criminalized certain intimate sexual conduct between two persons of the 
same sex.
16
 Overruling a prior case, the Court held, in an opinion by Justice 
Kennedy, that the Texas statute violated the Due Process Clause.17 
Although it does not involve international sources, I cannot resist quoting the 
opening paragraph of the opinion, not only because it sets the stage, but because 
it is a shining example of the eloquence and inspirational language of which 
Anthony Kennedy is capable. Justice Kennedy wrote: 
 Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions 
into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not 
omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and 
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant 
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, 
and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the 
person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.18 
By framing the case in this way, Justice Kennedy won the rhetorical battle in the 
first paragraph of the opinion. 
But, of course, Justice Kennedy went on to marshal evidence, both historical 
and contemporary, concerning the treatment of same-sex relations in British and 
U.S. law. He concluded that “the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers [the 
earlier decision of the Court that Lawrence overruled] are more complex than the 
majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger indicate. 
Their historical premises are not without doubt and, at the very least, are 
overstated.”19 
Justice Kennedy reserved particular attention for Chief Justice Burger’s 
remark in his opinion in Bowers that “‘[d]ecisions of individuals relating to 
homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the 
history of Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted 
in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards.’”20 
 
15. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
16. Id. at 562. 
17. Id. at 578–79. 
18. Id. at 562. 
19. Id. at 571. 
20. Id. (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)). 
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Justice Kennedy responded in a way that well illustrates his thinking: 
 The sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger to the history of 
Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards 
did not take account of other authorities pointing in an opposite direction. 
A committee advising the British Parliament recommended in 1957 
repeal of laws punishing homosexual conduct. Parliament enacted the 
substance of those recommendations 10 years later. 
 Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was 
decided the European Court of Human Rights considered a case with 
parallels to Bowers and to today’s case. An adult male resident in 
Northern Ireland alleged he was a practicing homosexual who desired to 
engage in consensual homosexual conduct. The laws of Northern Ireland 
forbade him that right. He alleged that he had been questioned, his home 
had been searched, and he feared criminal prosecution. The court held 
that the laws proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Authoritative in all countries that are 
members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations now), the 
decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward 
was insubstantial in our Western civilization.21 
After demonstrating that the Supreme Court had rejected the foundations of 
Bowers in other decisions, Justice Kennedy returned to the broader picture. He 
observed: 
 To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider 
civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers 
have been rejected elsewhere. The European Court of Human Rights has 
followed not Bowers but its own decision in [the case referred to earlier]. 
Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of 
the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, 
consensual conduct. The right the petitioners seek in this case has been 
accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries. 
There has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest 
in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or 
urgent.22 
These references did not escape Justice Scalia’s attention. In his dissenting 
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia 
responded: “The Court’s discussion of . . . foreign views . . . is . . . meaningless 
 
21. Id. at 572–73 (citations omitted). 
22. Id. at 576–77 (citations omitted). 
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dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since ‘this Court . . . should not impose foreign 
moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.’”23 Here, Justice Scalia was quoting from 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in denying certiorari in another case,24 evidently 
unable to find any actual precedent to use as support for his views. 
I can be more brief with respect to the other two cases, because the dynamics 
within the Court in Lawrence set the tone for the cases to follow. In Roper v. 
Simmons, a Missouri court sentenced Mr. Simmons to death for a murder he 
committed when he was seventeen years old.25 Justice Kennedy authored the 
Court’s opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, 
affirming the Missouri Supreme Court’s grant of the defendant’s petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus. The Court held that execution of individuals who were 
under eighteen at the time of their capital crimes is prohibited by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.26 
After deciding on the basis of U.S. authority that the death penalty cannot be 
imposed on juvenile offenders, Justice Kennedy devoted the entirety of Part IV 
of his opinion to the practice in other countries.27 The following portions of this 
analysis indicate the flavor of his thinking: 
 Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate 
punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality 
that the United States is the only country in the world that continues to 
give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty. This reality does not 
become controlling, for the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment 
remains our responsibility. Yet at least from the time of the Court’s 
decision in Trop, the Court has referred to the laws of other countries and 
to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments.”28 
Justice Kennedy was here referring to Trop v. Dulles, a 1958 plurality 
opinion in which the Court found it necessary to take into account “the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” to determine 
which punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual.29 
Justice Kennedy also noted that “Article 37 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which every country in the world has 
ratified save for the United States and Somalia, contains an express prohibition 
 
23. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in denial of certiorari)). 
24. Id. 
25. 543 U.S. 551, 556 (2005). 
26. Id. at 554, 559–60. 
27. Id. at 575–78. 
28. Id. at 575. 
29. 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
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on capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles under 18.”30 This 
chastening statement is laudable,31 but thus far has not succeeded in moving the 
government to become a party to that treaty. 
Justice Kennedy concluded: 
 It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of 
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large 
part on the understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance of 
young people may often be a factor in the crime. The opinion of the 
world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide 
respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.32 
Justices O’Connor and Scalia filed dissenting opinions.33 Justice Scalia 
devoted an entire section of his opinion, Part III, to the majority’s use of, what he 
called, “the views of other countries and the so-called international 
community.”34 He charged that while the majority examined the record of 
application of the juvenile death penalty in the twenty U.S. states that permit it, 
“the Court is quite willing to believe that every foreign nation—of whatever 
tyrannical political makeup and with however subservient or incompetent a court 
system—in fact adheres to a rule of no death penalty for offenders under 18.”35 
Then Justice Scalia contended that “the basic premise of the Court’s argument—
that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—ought to 
be rejected out of hand.”36 This was not, of course, a premise of the Court’s 
reasoning.37 It is rather a straw man that Justice Scalia set up so he can easily 
knock it down.38 
Justice Scalia concluded his discussion of foreign law with an attack on the 
final paragraph of Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court, which reads: “It does 
not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to 
acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other 
nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within 
our own heritage of freedom.”39  
 
30. Roper, 542 U.S. at 576. 
31. See id. 
32. Id. at 578 (citation omitted). 
33. Id. at 587 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
34. Id. at 622–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
35. Id. at 623. 
36. Id. at 624. 
37. See id. at 575–78. 
38. See id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
39. Id. at 628 (quoting id. at 578). 
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Justice Scalia, obviously unsettled by this eloquent explanation, fired back:  
The Court’s parting attempt to downplay the significance of its extensive 
discussion of foreign law is unconvincing. “Acknowledgment” of foreign 
approval has no place in the legal opinion of this Court unless it is part of 
the basis for the Court’s judgment—which is surely what it parades as 
today.40 
Justice Scalia disdains the idea that the United States should conform with 
the rest of the world. This might be a defensible doctrine if it dealt with economic 
or other matters not fitting within the field of international human-rights law. But 
the United States, whether Justice Scalia likes it or not, is bound by international 
law, including the branch of international law dealing with human rights. If we 
are an outlier in this area, the clear implication is that we are in breach of relevant 
treaties or, if the United States is not a party to those treaties, customary 
international law. If this is what Justice Scalia wishes for us, it is something that 
runs entirely counter to the tenets of the Framers of our Constitution that Justice 
Scalia holds so dear.41 
Justice O’Connor also dissented from the Court’s judgment.42 On the use of 
what she called “foreign and international law,”43 Justice O’Connor had the 
following to say: 
Without question, there has been a global trend in recent years toward 
abolishing capital punishment for under-18 offenders. Very few, if any, 
countries other than the United States now permit this practice in law or 
in fact. While acknowledging that the actions and views of other 
countries do not dictate the outcome of our Eighth Amendment inquiry, 
the Court asserts that “the overwhelming weight of international opinion 
against the juvenile death penalty . . . does provide respected and 
significant confirmation for [its] own conclusions.” Because I do not 
believe that a genuine national consensus against the juvenile death 
penalty has yet developed, and because I do not believe the Court’s 
moral proportionality argument justifies a categorical, age-based 
constitutional rule, I can assign no such confirmatory role to the 
international consensus described by the Court. . . . 
Nevertheless, I disagree with JUSTICE SCALIA’s contention . . . that 
foreign and international law have no place in our Eighth Amendment 
 
40. Id. 
41. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text (providing early instances of the Court’s respect for 
international law). 
42. Id. at 587–607 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
43. Id. at 604. 
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jurisprudence. Over the course of nearly half a century, the Court has 
consistently referred to foreign and international law as relevant to its 
assessment of evolving standards of decency. This inquiry reflects the 
special character of the Eighth Amendment, which, as the Court has long 
held, draws its meaning directly from the maturing values of civilized 
society.44 
These passages are interesting for several reasons. First, Justice O’Connor 
does not take issue with Justice Kennedy’s use of international authority to 
confirm conclusions the Court has arrived at independently.45 Second, Justice 
O’Connor seems to go even further than Justice Kennedy, suggesting that 
“foreign and international law is relevant to [the Court’s] assessment of evolving 
standards of decency”46—that is, that such sources are relevant to the initial 
assessment, not just as confirmation of a conclusion at which the Court has 
already arrived. Finally, one cannot help but see in these lines a reflection of the 
close intellectual relationship Justices O’Connor and Kennedy had forged over 
the years and, in contrast, the rather antagonistic one that Justice Scalia had 
precipitated with Justice O’Connor.47 
The final case I would like to touch upon is Graham v. Florida, a 2010 
decision of the Court.48 Graham involved the question of whether imposing a 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole on a juvenile offender violates 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.49 Graham 
was sixteen when he committed armed burglary and another crime.50 After he 
violated the terms of his probation by committing other crimes, he was sentenced 
to life in prison.51 Florida had abolished its parole system, leaving executive 
clemency as Graham’s only possibility for release.52 
The Court held that imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of 
parole on a juvenile offender violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment.53 In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court 
again found support for its conclusion in the practices of other nations and the 
 
44. Id. at 604–05 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
45. See id. 
46. Id. at 604 (emphasis added). 
47. See, e.g., David M. O’Brien, High-Court Power Play: Thomas, Scalia vs. O’Connor, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (Mar. 15, 1992), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1992-03-15/news/9203130247_1_scalia-joined-
justice-antonin-scalia-thomas (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Tensions between Scalia and 
O’Connor went public in the 1989 decision Webster vs. Reproductive Health Services.”). 
48. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
49. Id. at 2017–18. 
50. Id. at 2018–20. 
51. Id.  
52. Id. at 2020. 
53. Id. at 2034. 
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international community.54 Justice Kennedy observed that the United States, “in 
continuing to impose life without parole sentences on juveniles who did not 
commit homicide, . . . adheres to a sentencing practice rejected the world over.”55 
He then wrote that while “[t]his observation does not control our decision[ and 
t]he judgments of other nations and the international community are not 
dispositive as to the meaning of the Eighth Amendment,”56 “[t]he climate of 
international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular punishment is 
also not irrelevant.”57 
The amici of the State of Florida had argued “that no international legal 
agreement that is binding on the United States prohibits life without parole for 
juvenile offenders and [urged the Court] to ignore the international consensus.”58 
Justice Kennedy’s response was firm:  
These arguments miss the mark. The question before us is not whether 
international law prohibits the United States from imposing the sentence 
at issue in this case. The question is whether that punishment is cruel and 
unusual. In that inquiry, “the overwhelming weight of international 
opinion against” life without parole for nonhomicide offenses committed 
by juveniles “provide[s] respected and significant confirmation for our 
own conclusions.”59  
Justice Kennedy further explained: 
The Court has treated the laws and practices of other nations and 
international agreements as relevant to the Eighth Amendment not 
because those norms are binding or controlling but because the judgment 
of the world’s nations that a particular sentencing practice is inconsistent 
with basic principles of decency demonstrates that the Court’s rationale 
has respected reasoning to support it.60 
Rather remarkably, there was no dissent from this section of the opinion. 
The foregoing opinions of Justice Kennedy show that he has continued a 
longstanding practice of the Court of referring to international materials in 
decisions on matters of fundamental constitutional moment.61 These opinions, 
when read together, raise the tantalizing question of whether Justice Kennedy 
may be laying the groundwork for a larger role for international materials in 
 
54. Id. at 2033–34. 
55. Id. at 2033. 
56. Id. (citations omitted). 
57. Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
58. Id. at 2034 (citing the Solidarity Center for Law and Justice). 
59. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)). 
60. Id. 
61. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  
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future cases—one that would use such materials not only to support or confirm a 
constitutional interpretation on which the Court had already decided, but would 
play a role in the determination of the proper interpretation itself. 
III. CONCLUSION 
It is interesting to speculate on what motivates Justice Kennedy to give a 
special place to international sources in some of his opinions. It is not improbable 
that one factor that is at least partly responsible for Justice Kennedy’s awareness 
of the way in which other countries and systems handle some of the difficult 
issues that come before the Supreme Court is his having taught for nearly a 
quarter of a century in University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law’s 
summer program at the University of Salzburg in Austria.62 Justice Kennedy 
taught a course in this program called Fundamental Rights, with Professor 
Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, now of Oxford University. Professor Douglas-Scott 
focused on the European human rights system while Justice Kennedy examined 
some of the difficult issues the United States Supreme Court has had to deal with 
in the context of our Bill of Rights. Thus, this amounted to a course in 
comparative human rights law. I suspect that just as the fortunate students 
learned much from these two professors, the professors learned from each other, 
as well. It does not seem far-fetched to imagine that regular exposure to 
developments in Europe’s advanced human rights system may have strengthened 
Justice Kennedy’s resolve to draw upon that experience in appropriate cases and 
to defend doing so against assaults from some of his colleagues on the Court. 
But whatever his motivation for referring to international sources, I believe 
Justice Kennedy’s opinions are richer and more compelling for this practice, and 
that the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is strengthened significantly by it. 
For these reasons, it is to be hoped that Justice Kennedy will continue to take 
international materials into account as appropriate in future opinions. 
 
 
62. For more information about the summer program, see UNIVERSITY OF THE PACIFIC, MCGEORGE 
SCHOOL OF LAW, SUMMER IN SALZBURG, AUSTRIA, http://mcgeorge.edu/Future_Students/JD_Program/ 
Global_Impact/Study_Abroad/Summer_in_Salzburg.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
